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THE SHADOW PRICE OF HEALTH
In the previous chapter, 1 showed how a consumer selects the optimal
quantity of health in any period of his life. In this chapter, 1 explore the
effects of changes in the supply and demand prices of health in the context
of the pure investment model. In Section 1, I comment on the demand
curve for health capital in the investment model.. In Section 2, I relate
variations in depreciation rates with age to life cycle patterns of health
and gross investment. I also examine the impact of changes in depreciation
rates among individuals of the same age and briefly incorporate
uncertainty into the model. In the third section, I consider the effects of
shifts in market efficiency, measured by the wage rate, and nonmarket
efficiency, measured by human capital, on supply and demand prices.
1. THE INVESTMENT DEMAND CURVE
if the marginal utility of healthy days or the marginal disutility of sick
days were equal to zero, health would be solely an investment commodity.
The optimal amount ofcould then be found by equating the marginal
monetary rate of return on an investment in health to the cost of health
capital:
== r — + (2-1)
Setting Uh1 =0in equation (1-13'), one derives equation (2-1). It can
also be derived by excluding health from the utility function and re-
defining the full wealth constraint as
R' =A0+ (2-2)
Maximization of R' with respect to gross investment in periods I —1and
i yields condition (2-1).'
For a proof, see Appendix B, Section 1. The continuous time version of(2-1) is
whereis the instantaneous percentage rate of change in marginal cost. This equation, too, is
derived in Appendix B, Section 1.12 The Demand for Health
Figure 1 illustrates the determination of the optimal stock of health
capital at any age i. The demand curve MEC shows the relationship
between the stock of health and the rate of return on an investment or the
marginal efficiency of health capital. The supply curve S shows the
relationship between the stock of health and the cost of capital: Since the
real-own rate of interest and the rate of depreciation are independent of
the stock, the supply curve is infinitely elastic. Provided the MEC schedule
slopes downward, the equilibrium stock is given by where the supply
and demand curves intersect.
7, r-T1.1
In the model, the wage rate and the marginal cost of gross investment
do not depend on the stock of health. Therefore, the MEC schedule
would be negatively inclined if and only if the marginal product of health
capital were diminishing. Since the output produced by health capital
has a finite upper limit of 365 healthy days, it seems reasonable to assume
diminishing marginal productivity. Figure 2 shows a plausible relationship
between the stock of health and the number of healthy days. This relation-
ship may be called the production function of healthy days. The slope of
the curve in the figure at any point gives the marginal product of health
capital. The number of healthy days equals zero at the death stock,
Hmjn, so that Q =TL1= 365 is an alternative definition of death.
Beyond Hmjn, healthy time increases at a decreasing rate and eventually
MEC
Figure 1
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approaches its upper asymptote of 365 days as the stock becomes
large.2
2. VARIATIONS IN DEPRECIATION RATES
Life Cycle Patterns
Equation (2-1) enables one to study the behavior of the demand for
health and gross investment over the life cycle. To simplify the analysis,
it is assumed that the wage rate, the stock of knowledge, the marginal
cost of gross investment, and the marginal productivity of health capital
are independent of age. These assumptions are not as restrictive as they
may seem. To be sure, wage rates and human capital are undoubtedly
correlated with age, but the effects of shifts in these variables are treated
in Section 3. Therefore, the results obtained in this section may be viewed
as partial effects. That is, they show the impact of a pure increase in age
on the demand for health, with all other variables held constant.3
2Certainproduction functions might exhibit upper asymptotes but increasing or
Constant marginal productivity in some regions. In general, if discontinuities in the MEC
schedule are ruled out, the sufficient condition for maximizing R' with respect to H1 requires
diminishing marginal productivity in the vicinity of the equilibrium stock. For a complete
discussion of this point, seeAppendixB, Section 1.
For an analysis of life cycle phenomena that allows wage rates and human capital to
vary with age, see equation (2.21).
365
Hmin
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Since marginal cost does not depend on age, =0,and equation
(2-1) reduces to
=r +(5,. (2-3)
It is apparent from equation (2:3) that if the rate of depreciation were
independent of age, a single quantity of H would satisfy the equality
between the marginal rate of return and the cost of health capital.
Consequently, there would be no net investment or disinvestment after
the initial period. One could not, in general, compare H0 and H1 because
accumulation in the initial period would depend on the discrepancy
between the inherited stock and the stock desired in period 1. This
discrepancy in turn would be related to variations in H0 and other
variables across individuals. But, given, zero costs of adjusting to the
desired level immediately, H would be constant after period 1. Under the
stated condition of a constant depreciation rate, individuals would choose
an infinite life if they choose to live beyond period 1. In other words,
if H would always exceed the death stock.4
To permit the demand for health to vary with age, assume that the
rate of depreciation depends on age. In general, any time path of (5.is
possible. For example, the rate of depreciation might be negatively
correlated with age during early stages of the life cycle. Or the time path
might be nonmonotonic, so thatrises during some periods and falls
during others. Despite the existence of a wide variety of possible time
paths, it is extremely plausible to assume that 5, is positively correlated
with age after some point in the life cycle. This correlation can be inferred
because as an individual ages, his physical strength and memory capacity
deteriorate. Surely, a rise in the rate of depreciation on his stock of health
is merely one manifestation of the biological process of aging. Therefore,
the analysis focuses on the effects of an increase in the rate of depreciation
with age.
Since a rise inincreases the cost of health capital, it would cause
the demand for health to fall over the life cycle. Graphically, an upward
shift in the of capital from r+to r+ in Figure 3 reduces the
optimal stock from H, to H1÷1. The greater is the elasticity of the MEC
schedule, the greater the decrease in the optimal stock with age. Put
differently, the slower is the increase in the marginal product of health
capital as H falls, the greater the decrease in the optimal stock.
possibility that death can occur in period I is ruled out from now on.Differentiation of equation (2-3) with respect to age quantifies the
percentage rate of decrease in the stock of health over the life cycle:
= — (2-4)
















= elasticityof MEC schedule.5
Equation (2-4) indicates that the absolute value of the percentage decrease
in H is positively related to the elasticity of the MEC schedule, the share
of depreciation in the cost of health capital, and the percentage rate of









where16 The Demand for Health
increase in the rate of depreciation. If; andwereconstant, the curve
relating in H1 to age would be concave unless r=0 since6
= = —s1(1 — <0. (2-5)
The absolute value of 11,increasesover the life cycle because the share of
depreciation in the cost of capital rises with age.
Ifgrows continuously with age after some point in the life cycle,
persons would choose to live a finite life. Since H declines over the life
cycle, it would eventually fall to Hmin, the death stock. When the cost of
health capital is r +in Figure 3, Hmjn, and death occurs. At
death, no time is available for market and nonmarket activities since
healthy time equals zero. Therefore, the monetary equivalent of sick time
in period n would completely exhaust potential full earnings,
Moreover, consumption of the commodity Z,, would equal zero since no
time would be available for its production if total time equals sick time.7
Because individuals could not produce commodities, total utility would
be driven to zero at death.8
Having characterized the optimal path ofone can proceed to
examine the behavior of gross investment. Gross investment's life cycle
profile would not, in general, simply mirror that of health capital. In
other words, even though health capital falls over the life cycle, gross
investment might increase, remain constant, or decrease. This follows
because a rise in the rate of depreciation not only reduces the amount of
health capital demanded by consumers but also reduces the amount of
capital supplied to them by a given amount of gross investment. If the
change in supply exceeded the change in demand, individuals would have
an incentive to close this gap by increasing gross investment. On the
other hand, if the change in supply were less than the change in demand,
gross investment would tend to fall over the life cycle.
6Differentiationof (2-4) with respect to age yields






This assumes that Zcannotbe produced with X alone; which would be true if, say,
the production function were Cobb-Douglas.
8Utilityequals zero when H =Hminprovided the death time utility function is such that
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To predict the effect of an increase inwith age on gross investment,
note that net investment can be approximated by H.R1.9 Since gross
investment equals net investment plus depreciation,
ln=InH1 + in (R1 + (2-6)
Differentiation of equation (2-6) with respect to age yields
I — + ++
Supposeand s, were constant. Then from (2-4) and (2-5),theexpression
for I, would simplify to
—8(1— —s,€8)+
2 7 I— -
Sincehealth capital cannot be sold, gross investment cannot be
negative. Therefore. —P,.'° That is, if the stock of health falls over
the life cycle, the absolute value of the percentage rate of net disinvestment
cannot exceed the rate of depreciation. Provided gross investment does
not equal zero, the term —s1c6in equation (2-7) must exceed zero.
It follows that a sufficient condition for gross investmentbe positively
correlated with the depreciation rate is<1/s1. Thus,would definitely
be positive at every point if< 1.
The important conclusion is reached that if the elasticity of the
MEC schedule were less than one, gross investment and the depreciation
rate would be positively correlated over the life cycle, while gross invest-
ment and the stock of health would be negatively correlated. Phrased
differently, given a relatively inelastic demand curve for health, individuals
would desire to offset part of the reduction in health capital caused by an
increase in the rate of depreciation by increasing their gross investments.
In fact, the relationship between the stock of health and the number of
healthy days suggests that c is smaller than one. A general equation for
the healthy days production function illustrated by Figure 2 is
h, =365—BHrC, (2-8)
That is, —H,H,(dH,/di)(1/H1) =Hft,.The use of this approximation
essentially allows one to ignore the one period lag between a change in gross investment and
a change in the stock of health.
investment is nonnegative as long as= + ô1) ￿ 0, or ö1 ￿ —R1.18 The Demand for Health
where B and C are positive constants. The corresponding MEC schedule
is'1
in=inBC —(C+ 1) In H. + in W —Init. (2-9)
The elasticity of this schedule is given by
= =1/(1+ C) < 1,
since C > 0.
Observe that with the depreciation rate held constant, increases in
gross investment would increase the stock of health and the number of
healthy days. But the preceding discussion indicates that because the
depreciation rate rises with age, it is not unlikely that unhealthy (old)
people will make larger gross investments than healthy (young) people.
This means that sick time, TL1, will be positively correlated with M. and
TH,, the medical care and own time inputs in the gross investment;
function, over the life cycle.'2 In this sense, at least part of TL, or TH,
may be termed "recuperation time."
Unlike other models of the demand for medical care, my model does
not assertthat"need" or illness, measured by the level of the rate of
depreciation, will definitely be positively correlated with utilization of
medical services. Instead, it derives this correlation from the magnitude
of the elasticity of the MEC schedule and indicates that the relationship
between the stock of health and the number of healthy days will tend to
create a positive correlation. Ifis less than one, medical care and "need"
will definitely be positively correlated. Moreover, the smaller the value
of c, the greater the explanatory power of "need" relative to that of the
other variables in the demand curve for medical care.
It should be realized that the power of this model of life cycle
behavior is that it can treat the biological process of aging in terms of
conventional economic analysis. Biological factors associated with aging
raise the price of health capital and cause individuals to substitute away
from future health until death is "chosen." It can be concluded that here,
as elsewhere in economics, people will reject a prospect—the prospect
lf(2-8)were the production function, the marginal product of health capital would be
=BCHrC_l,ormG1 =InBC —(C + l)InH1.
Since In y, =InG1 + In W —Inn, one usesthe equationfor Into obtain (2-9).
12Notethat the time path of H1 or h, would benonmonotonicif the time path of ô1
were characterized bythe occurrenceofpeaksand troughs. In particular,would be
relatively low and TH1 and M, would be relatively high (ifs <1)when ö1 was relatively high;
these periods would be associated with relatively severe illness.The Shadow Price of Health 19
of longer life in this case—because it is too costly to achieve. In partic-
ular, only if the elasticity of the MEC schedule were zero would individuals
fully compensate for the increase in ö1 and, therefore, maintain a constant
stock of health.
Cross-Sectional Variations
The framework used to analyze life cycle variations in depreciation
rates can easily be applied to examine the impact of variations in these
rates among individuals of the same age. Assume, for example, a uniform
percentage shift inacross persons so that
dlnö1,ai.
Itis clear that such a shift would have the same kinds of effects as an
increase inwith age. That is, persons of a given age who face relatively
high depreciation rates would simultaneously reduce their demand for
health but would increase their demand for gross investment if< 1.
Differentiating equations (2-3)and(2-6) with respect to in ö-, one obtains'3
(2-10)
d in (1 —s.c)(51 — +
din= —
(2-11)
According to (2-10) and (2-11), ifwere less than unity, H, or h. would be
negatively correlated with TH, and M1 (and would be positively
correlated with these inputs) across individuals of the same age.
Uncertainty
The development of the model to this point has ruled out uncertainty.
Consumers fully anticipate intertemporal and cross-sectional variations
in depreciation rates and, therefore, know their age of death with certainty.
In the real world, however, length of life is surely not known with perfect
foresight. In order to explain variations in death time expectations,
uncertainty must be introduced into the, model. The easiest way to
accomplish this is to postulate that a given consumer faces a probability
1,3Derivationsof (2-10) and (2-11) are contained in Appendix B, Section 2.20 The Demand for Health
distribution of depreciation rates in every period. For simplicity, let there
be two depreciation rates,and51b'where> Thesedepreciation
rates correspond to two mutually exclusive outcomes, a and b.Since
depreciation rates are not known with certainty, length of life can no
longer be determined in a precise fashion. In particular, it would depend
on the pattern of depreciation rates that actually occurs and would tend
to be longer with patterns in which outcome b occurred more frequently
than outcome a. But because depreciation rates rise with age, the stock of
health would still tend to fall over the life cycle.
Besides creating dispersion in death time expectations, the existence
of uncertainty has a number of additional implications. These follow
from the state-preference approach to the problem of choice under
uncertainty.'5 Since none of the major conclusions reached in this section
and the next one tend to be altered, I will simply state here the main
results of the analysis.'6 At any given age, health capital would tend to be
lower and sick time and gross investment would tend to be higher in
relatively undesirable "states of the world," i.e., outcomes with higher
than average depreciation rates. The monetary value of the excess sick
time and gross investment measures the "loss" associated with unfavor-
able states. Since this loss could be reduced by increasing the stock of
health, consumers might have an incentive to hold excess stocks in
relatively desirable states. In these states, the rate of return to an increase
in H. might be less than the cost of capital. Put differently, part of the
demand for health capital would reflect a demand for self-insurance
against losses in unfavorable states.
Consumers could also finance the monetary value of their losses by
purchasing health insurance in the market. Conclusions reached by
Ehrlich and Becker suggest that market health insurance and the stock
of health should be substitutes; that is, an increase in market insurance
14Ingeneral, ö,+>ô,,,,and >since depreciation rates rise with age.
This approach was developed by Jack Hirshleifer in "Investment Decisions under
Uncertainty: Choice-Theoretic Approaches," QuarterlyJournal ofEconomics, 79, No. 4
(November 1965). For an application to some general insurance problems, see isaac Ehrlich
and Gary S. Becker, "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance and Self-Protection," Journal of
Political Economy, 80, No. 4 (July/August 1972).
16Forderivations of these results, see Michael Grossman, "The Demand for Health:
A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University, 1970, Appendix B, pp. 13 1—135. Note that the assumption of perfect certainty
is reintroduced at the end of this subsection. The empirical implementation of the model
makes some attempt, however, to deal with uncertainty. See the discussion of this pheno-
menon in Chapter IV, Section 2, and Chapter V, Section 1.The ShadowPriceof Health 21
would increase the optimal loss and reduce the stock of health.17 Note
finally that it is doubtful whether consumers can ever fully insure against
all losses via the market. This follows because full insurance would not
only finance the monetary value of excess gross investment and working
time lost in states with high depreciation rates, but would also finance the
monetary value of time lost from nonmarket activities. Hence, the demand
for health capital may be substantial even when market insurance is
available.
3. MARKET AND NONMARKET EFFICIENCY
Persons who face the same cost of health capital would demand the same
amount of health only if the determinants of the rate of return on an
investment were held constant. Changes in the value of the marginal
product of health capital and the marginal cost of gross investment shift
the MEC schedule and, therefore, alter the quantity of health demanded
even if the cost of capital does not change. I now identify the variables
that determine the level of the MEC schedule and examine the effects of
shifts in these variables on the demand for health and medical care.
Before beginning the analysis, two preliminary comments are in
order. First, most of the discussion pertains to uniform shifts in variables
that influence the rate of return across persons of the same age. That is,
if the variable X. is one determinant, then
=1,all i.
dlnX1_1
Second, the discussion (through equation 2-20) proceeds under the
assumption that the real rate of interest, the rate of depreciation, and the
elasticity of the MEC schedule are constant. These two comments imply
that an increase in X, will alter the amount of capital demanded but





17SeeEhrlich and Becker, "Market Insurance."
18Strictlyspeaking, shifts in X, would definitelyhaveno effects on 11, if and only if
=0.Even though a uniform shift inimplies there is no correlation between its level
and rate of change,mightbe altered if 2, #0.For a complete discussion, see footnote 30.22 The Demand for Health
since the rate of depreciation and the percentage rate of net investment
do not depend on X.'9 Equation (2-12) indicates that percentage changes
in health and gross investment for a one unit change in X are identical.
Consequently, the effect of an increase in X on either of these two variables
can be treated interchangeably.
Wage Effects
Since the value of the marginal product of health capital equals WG,
an increase in the wage rate, W, raises the monetary equivalent of the
marginal product of a given stock. Put differently, the higher a person's
wage rate the greater the value to him of an increase in healthy time.
A consumer's wage rate measures his market efficiency or the rate at
which he can, convert hours of work into money earnings. Hence, it is
obviously positively correlated with the benefits of a reduction in the
time he loses from the production of money earnings due to illness.
Moreover, a high wage rate induces an individual to substitute market
goods for his own time in the production of commodities. This substitu-
tion continues until in equilibrium the monetary value of the marginal
product of consumption time equals the wage rate. So the benefits from
a reduction in time lost from nonmarket production are also positively
correlated with the wage.
If an upward shift in the wage rate had no effect on the marginal cost
of gross investment, a 1 percent increase in it would increase the rate of
return, y, associated with a fixed stock of capital by 1 percent. In fact,
this is not the case because own time is an input in the gross investment
function. If K is the fraction of the total cost of gross investment accounted
for by time, then a 1 percent rise in W would increase marginal cost, iv,
byK percent. After one nets out the correlation between W and 1r,the
percentage growth in y would equal 1 —K,which exceeds zero as long as
gross investment is not produced entirely by time.
Since the wage rate and the level of the MEC schedule are positively
correlated, the demand for health would be positively related to W.
Graphically, an upward shift in W from W1 to W2 in Figure 4 shifts the
MEC schedule from MEC1 to MEC2 and, with no change in the cost of
'9Sincethe main parr of the analysis in this section deals with variations in X among
individuals of the same age, time subscripts are omitted until equation (2-21). Note also
that (2-12), like the expression for 7,, ignores the one period lag between an increase in
gross investment and an increase in the stock of health.The Shadow Price of Health 23
health capital, increases the optimal stock from H1 to H2. A formula for
the wage elasticity of health capital is2°
= (1—K)c. (2-13)
This elasticity is larger the larger the elasticity of the MEC schedule
and the larger the share of medical care in total gross investment cost.
Although the wage rate and the demand for health or gross invest-
ment are positively related, W has no effect on the amount of gross
investment supplied by a given input of medical care. Therefore, the
demand for medical care would rise with the wage. If medical care and
own time were employed in fixed proportions in the gross investment
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production function, the wage elasticity of M would equal the wage
elasticity of H. On the other hand, given a positive elasticity of substitu-
tion, M would increase more rapidly than H. This follows because
consumers would have an incentive to substitute medical care for their
relatively more expensive own time. A formula for the wage elasticity of
medical care is
eMW = + (1 — (2-14)
where a,,is the elasticity of substitution between M and TH in the produc-
tion of gross investment.21 The greater the value of a,, the greater the
difference between the wage elasticities of M and H.
Note that an increase in either the price of medical care or own time
raises the marginal or average cost of gross investment. But the effects
of changes in these two input prices are not symmetrical. In particular,
an upward shift in the price of medical care lowers the MEC schedule
and causes the demand for health to decline. This difference arises because
the price of time influences the value of the marginal product of health
capital, while the price of medical care does not.
The Role of Human Capital
Up to now, no systematic allowance has been made for variations
in the efficiency of nonmarket production. Yet it is known that firms in
the market sector of an economy obtain varying amounts of output from
the same vector of direct inputs. These differences have been traced to
forces like technology and entrepreneurial capacity, forces that shift
production functions or that alter the environment in which the firms
operate. Reasoning by analogy, one can say that certain environmental
variables influence productivity in the nonmarket sector by altering the
marginal products of the direct inputs in household production functions.
This study is particularly concerned with environmental variables that
can be associated with a particular person—his or her race, sex, stock of
human capital, etc.22 While the analysis that follows could pertain to any
21Fora proof, see Appendix B, Section 2. The corresponding equation for the wage
elasticity of TH is
eTH.W= (1 — K)(e—
Thiselasticity is positive only if c >
22 Recallfrom Chapter 1 that at an operational level the stock of knowledge or human
capital does not include health capital.The Shadow Price of Health 25
environmentalvariable, it is well documented that the more educated
are more efficient producers of money earnings. Consequently, itis
assumed that shifts in human capital, measured by education, change
productivity in the household as well as in the market, and the analysis
focuses on this environmental variable.
The specific hypothesis to be tested is that education improves non-
market productivity. If this were true, then one would have a convenient
way to analyze and quantify what have been termed the nonmonetary
benefits to an investment in education. The model can, however, treat
adverse as well as beneficial effects and suggests empirical tests to
discriminate between the two.23
To determine the effects of education on production, marginal cost,
and the demand for health and medical care, assume the gross investment
production function is homogeneous of degree one in its two direct
inputs—medical care and own time. Then the marginal product of E,
the index of human capital, would be
—tg')
êE
where g —tg'is the marginal pr.oduct of medical care and g' is the marginal
product of time.24 If a circumflex over a variable denotes a percentage




Equation(2-15) indicates that the percentage change in gross investment
supplied to a consumer by a one unit change in E is a weighted average
23Themodel developed here is somewhat similar to the one used by Robert 1. Michael
in TheEffect of Education on Efficiency in Consumption, NewYork, NBER, Occasional Paper
116, 1972. Michael's model examines the effects ofeducation on the demand for consumption
commodities and not investment commodities. His analysis, therefore, is more relevant to the
consumption model of health presented in Chapter 111.
24111 is homogeneous of degree one in M and TH, then from Euler's theorem
I =M(g—tg')+ THg'.
Differentiation of this equation with respect to E holding M and TH constant yields the
marginal product of human capital.26 The Demand for Health
of the percentage changes in the marginal products of M and TH.25. If
E increases productivity, then rH > 0. Provided E raises both marginal
products by the same percentage, equation (2-15) would simplify to
== (2-16)
In this case, education would have a "neutral" impact on the marginal
products of all factors. The rest of the discussion assumes "factor-
neutrality."
Because education raises the marginal product of the direct inputs,
it reduces the quantity of these inputs required to produce a given amount
of gross investment. Hence, with no change in input prices, an increase
in £ lowers average or marginal cost. In fact, one easily shows
ft = = = (2-17)
where ft is the percentage change in average or marginal cost.26 So if
education increases the marginal products of medical care and own time
by 3 percent, it would reduce the price of gross investment by 3 percent.
Suppose education does in fact raise productivity so that ir and E
are negatively correlated. Then with the wage rate and the marginal
product of a given stock of health held constant, an increase in education
would raise the marginal efficiency of health capital and shift the MEC
schedule to the right. In Figure 5, an increase in E from E1 to E2 shifts
the MEC curve from MEC1 to MEC2. If the cost of capital were indepen-..
dent of E, there would be no charge in the supply curve, and the more
educated would demand a larger optimal stock (compare H1 and H2 in
the figure). Note that E shifts the MEC schedule not because it is a
determinant of consumers' "tastes" for health but because it is a deter-
minant of nonmarket productivity.
25Insteadof putting education in the gross investment production function, one could
let it affect the rate of depreciation or the marginal productivity of health capital. This
approach has not been taken because a general treatment of environmental variables like
education must permit these variables to influence all household commodities. Since depre-
ciation rates and stock-flow relationships are relevant only if a particular commodity is
durable, a symmetrical development of the role of environmental variables requires that
they affect household production functions and not depreciation rates or stock-flow relation.
ships. In a more complicated version of the model, the gross investment function, the rate of
depreciation, and the marginal productivity of health capital might all depend on education.
But the basic implications of the model would not change.
26Fora proof, see Appendix B, Section 2, where the human capital formulas are
developed in more detail.The Shadow Price of Health ' 27
r+8
The percentage increase in the amount of health demanded for a
'one unit increase in E is given by27
fl= (2-18)
Since rH indicates the percentage increase in gross investment supplied
by a one unit increase in E, shifts in this variable would not alter the
demand for medical care or own time if rH equaledForexample,
a person with ten years of formal schooling might demand 3 percent
more health than a person with nine years. If the medical care and own
time inputs were held constant, the former individual's one extra year of
schooling might supply him with 3 percent more health. Given this
condition, both persons would demand the same amounts of M and TH.
As this example illustrates, any effect of a change in E on the demand for
medical care or time reflects a positive or negative differential between
and rH.
= =
r+ 5 are fixed and if Gdepends only onH, then





28 Thetermsand are equal because, by the definition of factor neutrality, E has
no effect on the ratio of the marginal product of M to the marginal product of
H1 H2
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Equation (2-19) suggests that if the elasticity of the MEC schedule
were less than unity, the more educated would demand more health but
less medical care. Put differently, they would have an incentive to offset
part of the increase in health caused by an increase in education by
reducing their purchases of medical services. Note that if rH were negative
andwere less than one, R would be negative and M would be positive
Since education improves market productivity, this study tests the hypo-
thesis that rH is positive. But the model is applicable whether rH is
positive or negative and gives empirical predictions in either case.
I)
JointEffects
This section has examined the partial effect of an increase in the wage
rate or an increase in education on the demand for health. But, surely,
these two variables are positively correlated, which raises two questions.
First, what is the combined effect of an expansion in education, one that
takes account of the impact of education on wage rates? Second, can
variations in nonmarket efficiency be separated empirically from varia-
tions in market efficiency?
A formula for R that combines market and nonmarket efficiency
changes is
(2-20)
where W is the percentage change in the wage rate for a one unit change
in E.29 Equation (2-20) reveals the dual motive of the more educated for
demanding more health capital. With nonmarket productivity constant,
an increase in E causes the demand price of health capital to rise at a
faster rate than the supply price, and with market productivity constant,
E is negatively correlated with the supply price. Integration of (2-20)
with respect to E yields
lnH =rHCE+(1 —K)slnW,
29IfW is not held constant as E increases, then
dln(r-i-ö)0dInWE3lnGdlnHêlnnaln,t dlnW
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provided rH, C, and K are constant. Hence, by regressing in H on E
and in W, partial market and nonmarket efficiency parameters can be
estimated. Of course, this procedure may break down if the correlation
between E and in W is extremely high. So it is the size of this correlation
that ultimately determines whether pure changes in nonmarket produc-
tivity can be isolated at the empirical level.
Along similar lines, the analysis of life cycle variations in the demand
for health can be modified to take account of the life cycle pattern of the
stock of human capital. Letting E1 =dE1/di,one would the formula
for I?, as follows:30
H1 + + (1 — (2-21)
If equation (2-2 1) were applied to individuals who had completed their
formal schooling, E would tend to increase at early ages due to on-the-
job training. Eventually it would, however, decline as depreciation on the
stock of human capital began to outweigh gross investment. Even if
were always positive, the positive values of E, at early stages of the life
cycle might make R1 positive during these stages. But ultimately the
30Replaceequation (2-1) with its continuous time analogue:
=r—+
Then if E, is not fixed as I increases,
—dIndE,0 In G1 d In 0 In; dE,0 Ind IndE,




s1 dE1di 0 in H1di OE,di0 in dE1di
S1 S
Notethat since the wage rate varies over the life cycle,would not, in general, equal
zero. Instead, it would be given by
= —rH)EI.




Provided the elasticity of substitution on production equaled unity, the second term on the
right-hand side of the equation would equal zero. The first term could be ignored if dEjdi
were relatively small or if the difference between and rH were small.
Note also that even ifand E1 were independent of ina uniform percentage shift
in wage rates across persons of the same age might alter R,. This follows because it would
change K. and hence the real rate of interest unless the elasticity of substitution in production
equaled one.30 The Demand for Health
effect of net disinvestment in human capital would strengthen the effect
of a rising depreciation rate.
4. GLOSSARY
A tilde over a variable denotes a percentage time derivative; a circumflex
over a variable denotes a percentage change per unit change in E; and a
dot over a variable denotes an absolute rate of change over the life cycle.
s, Share of depreciation in the cost of health capital
8 Elasticity of the MEC schedule
K Fraction of the total cost of gross investment accounted for by time
eHWElasticity of H with respect to W
eM,WElasticity of M with respect to W
Elasticity of substitution between medical care and own time in
the production of gross investment
r11 Percentage change in gross investment for a one unit change in E